Patent Law - The Next-to-Last Step to Software Patentability? by Levy, Ron Karl
Campbell Law Review
Volume 4
Issue 1 Fall 1981 Article 11
1981
Patent Law - The Next-to-Last Step to Software
Patentability?
Ron Karl Levy
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Campbell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law.
Recommended Citation
Ron Karl Levy, Patent Law - The Next-to-Last Step to Software Patentability?, 4 Campbell L. Rev. 219 (1981).
PATENT LAW-THE NEXT-TO-LAST STEP TO SOFTWARE
PATENTABILITY?-Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1960's, the question of legal protection for computer
software has been the basis for battle between the Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals (CCPA) and the Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO). The Patent Office generally has considered processes
using mathematical formulas to be unpatentable subject matter
under 35 USC § 101.1 The CCPA, considering appeals from the
1. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) states the following:
Inventions patentable
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improve-
ment thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title.
35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976) provides:
Conditions for patentability; novelty and loss of right to patent
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or
patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign coun-
try, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication
in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country,
more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the
United States, or
(c) he has abandoned the invention, or
(d) the invention was first patented or caused to be patented or was
the subject of an inventor's certificate, by the applicant or his legal rep-
resentatives or assigns in a foreign country prior to the date of the appli-
cation for patent in this country on an application filed more than twelve
months before the filing of the application in the United States, or
(e) the invention was described in a patent granted on an application
for patent by another filed in the United States before the invention
thereof by the applicant for patent, or an international application by
another who has fulfilled the requirements of paragraphs (1), (2), and (4)
of section 371(c) of this title before the invention thereof by the appli-
cant for patent, or
(f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be pat-
ented, or
(g) before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was made
in this country by another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or con-
cealed it. In determining priority of invention there shall be considered
1
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PTO Board of Appeals, consistently has reached the opposite
conclusion.
Prior to 1981, the Supreme Court delivered only three major
decisions which addressed the issue.' Although the Court did not
find the inventions claimed in those cases to be patentable, it did
not reject the possibility that claims involving computer programs
could be patentable subject matter under § 101. The rapid techno-
logical advances in computers in the past thirty years have meant
a tremendous growth in sales in the computer industry. The
software industry has grown as rapidly as computer technology,4
because without software, computer hardware is useless.' The
question of patentability is one which the computer industry
would like resolved quickly, because the profits in question could
be sizeable if the courts hold that software is patentable. In the
most recent attempt to resolve the battle between the CCPA and
the PTO, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision in Diamond v.
Diehr,6 determined that a process which requires the use of a
mathematical formula and a computer is patentable subject matter
under § 101.
not only the respective dates of conception and reduction to practice of
the invention, but also the reasonable diligence of one who was first to
conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to conception
by the other.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976) states the following:
Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically
disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differ-
ences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art
are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at
the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the
art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be nega-
tived by the manner in which the invention was made.
2. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219
(1976), Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
3. Amicus curiae briefs submitted in Parker v. Flook indicate that in 1976,
500,000 computer systems made by firms in America are in use throughout the
world. The estimated value of these computers is $85.7 billion. Estimates also
indicate that by this year, 1,100,000 computers, valued in excess of $138 billion,
will be in use. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (amicus curiae brief of Com-
puter and Business Equipment Manufacturers' Association, at 17-18).
4. Id. at 18.
5. See infra text at note 20.
6. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
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THE CASE
In 1975, respondents, Diehr and Lutton, employees and as-
signors of Federal-Mogul, filed a patent application which claimed
a process for molding raw rubber into cured precision parts. The
process required the use of a mold to shape the uncured rubber
under heat and pressure consistently to produce functional prod-
ucts. The respondents indicated that a perfect cure depended on
several factors, including inherent characteristics of the product
being produced, the temperature of the mold, and particularly the
amount of time the article remained in the mold. Using the Arrhe-
nius equation,7 one can calculate the time the rubber should re-
7. Typical claims in respondent's patent application are the following:
1. A method of operating a rubber-molding press for precision
molded compounds with the aid of a digital computer, comprising:
providing said computer with a data base for said press including at
least,
natural logarithm conversion data (In),
the activation energy constant (C) unique to each batch of said com-
pound being molded, and
a constant (x) dependent upon the geometry of the particular mold
of the press,
initiating an interval timer in said computer upon the closure of the
press for monitoring the elapsed time of said closure,
constantly determining the temperature (Z) of the mold at a location
closely adjacent to the mold cavity in the press during molding,
constantly providing the computer with the temperature (Z),
repetitively calculating in the computer, at frequent intervals during
each cure, the Arrhenius equation for reaction time during the cure,
which is
in v cz + x
where v is the total required cure time,
repetitively comparing in the computer at said frequent intervals
during the cure each said calculation of the total required cure time cal-
culated with the Arrhenius equation and said elapsed time, and
opening the press automatically when a said comparison indicates
equivalence.
2. The method of claim 1 including measuring the activation energy
constant for the compound being molded in the press with a rheometer
and automatically updating said data base within the computer in the
event of changes in the compound being molded in said press as mea-
sured by said rheometer.
11. A method of manufacturing precision molded articles from se-
lected synthetic rubber compounds in an openable rubber molding press
having at least one heated precision mold, comprising:
(a) heating said mold to a temperature range approximating a prede-
termined rubber curing temperature,
1981]
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main in the mold to produce the perfect cure, but to make this
calculation one must know the temperature within the mold.
Before respondents claimed their invention, the industry consid-
ered the temperature factor to be an uncontrolled variable. Conse-
quently, the general practice had been to remove the molded prod-
uct after the shortest possible time in which all parts of the final
product could be cured. This process relied only on estimations,
and often resulted in overcuring or undercuring the final product.
To avoid this problem, respondents claimed as a part of their
process a means for constantly measuring the temperature inside
the mold. This temperature was relayed to a computer which itera-
tively8 calculated the proper cure time using the Arrhenius equa-
tion. At the point when the calculated time equaled the actual
time that the mold had been closed, the computer automatically
opened the mold. Respondents claimed that the continuous tem-
(b) installing prepared unmolded synthetic rubber of a known com-
pound in a molding cavity of a predetermined geometry as defined by
said mold,
(c) closing said press to mold said rubber to occupy said cavity in
comformance with the contour of said mold and to cure said rubber by
transfer of heat thereto from said mold,
(d) initiating an interval timer upon the closure of said press for
monitoring the elapsed time of said closure,
(e) heating said mold during said closure to maintain the tempera-
ture thereof within said range approximating said rubber curing
temperature,
(f) constantly determining the temperature of said mold at a loca-
tion closely adjacent said cavity thereof throughout closure of said press,
(g) repetitively calculating at frequent periodic intervals through out
closure of said press the Arrhenius equation for reaction time of said
rubber to determine total required cure time v as follows:
1n v = cz + x
wherein c is an activation energy constant determined for said rub-
ber being molded and cured in said press, z is the temperature of said
mold at the time of each calculation of said Arrhenius equation, and x is
a constant which is a function of said predetermined geometry of said
mold,
(h) for each repetition of calculation of said Arrhenius equation
herein comparing the resultant calculated total required cure time with
the monitored elapsed time measured by said interval timer,
(i) opening said press when a said comparison of calculated total re-
quired cure time and monitored elapsed time indicates equivalence, and
(j) removing from said mold the resultant precision molded and
cured rubber article."
8. "Repetitiously."
222 [Vol. 4:219
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perature measuring process, the calculation process and the open-
ing of the press were all new in the art.
The patent examiner rejected these claims, relying on Gott-
schalk v. Benson,s but never determined whether the process was
novel, because in his view the respondents' claims which involved
the use of the computer were drawn to non-statutory subject mat-
ter under § 101. The examiner also concluded that the remaining
steps in the process were unpatentable because they were conven-
tional in nature, and found that respondents were seeking protec-
tion for a computer program which operates a rubber molding
process.
The Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals affirmed
the examiner's finding, but on appeal the CCPA reversed,10 indi-
cating that claims which the applicant draws to otherwise statu-
tory subject matter do not become non-statutory simply because
the process involves the use of a computer. The CCPA also decided
that respondents claimed an improved process for molding and
curing rubber products, but not a mathematical algorithm or an
improved method of calculation.
The Solicitor General and acting Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks, on behalf of the Government, then petitioned for cer-
tiorari, claiming that the CCPA's decision conflicted with other Su-
preme Court decisions. The Supreme Court granted the writ' to
resolve the question.1'
9. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
10. In re Diehr, 602 F.2d 982 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
11. The Courts have not been able to decide upon the definition of "al-
gorithm." One definition is a "fixed step-by-step procedure for solving a complex
problem." But see Diehr at 186, n. 9.
12. Diamond v. Diehr, 445 U.S. 926 (1980).
13. At that time, the Supreme Court heard arguments not only on the Diehr
question, but also on a companion case designated Diamond v. Bradley, in which
the claimed invention allowed information stored in scratchpad registers (tempo-
rary storage in the computer's memory) to be more easily modified using a
"firmware" module, a hardware component permanently encoded with a
microprogram to perform a specific function, located between the scratchpad reg-
isters and the operating system of the computer. In Bradley, the examiner, citing
Parker v. Flook, rejected the claims as unpatentable subject matter under 35
U.S.C. § 101 because they involved a mathematical algorithm. The CCPA re-
versed, as they did in Diehr, finding the invention to be a combination of tangible
hardware elements including microprogrammed firmware. The Supreme Court, in
a 4-4 decision reported at 450 U.S. 381 (1981) (the Chief Justice did not take
part) affirmed the decision of the lower court without issuing an opinion.
19811 223
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The Government, the petitioner in Diehr, argued"' that the
most recent Supreme Court decision, Parker v. Flook,1 controlled
the issue the case presented. The Court in Flook had held that a
claim for an improved method of calculation, even when tied to a
specific end use, was unpatentable subject matter under § 101. Pe-
titioner argued further that Flook stated a two-step test which
should be applied to determine whether a claimed invention is
statutory subject matter under § 101: (1) The examiner should
eliminate any claims which recite unpatentable scientific princi-
ples, ideas, concepts, formulas, or phenomena of nature; and (2) he
then should determine whether the remaining claims are novel. If
they are not novel, then they are not statutory subject matter
under § 101. Petitioner also claimed that the Court should not re-
examine its holding in Flook, because Congress, if it disagreed with
the Court's decision, must change the law, the Court having no
power to do so."
Respondents argued that their application as presented to the
PTO did not claim a computer program 7 or mathematical
formula, but instead claimed a process involving the change of raw
rubber into a new state through molding under pressure and heat.
The novelty of the claims, according to the respondents, lay in the
constant temperature measurement and continued computation of
cure time through the use of a computer and the Arrhenius equa-
tion. Respondents did not seek to preempt the use of any mathe-
matical formula; they only wanted to stop others from using the
Arrhenius equation in relation to the other steps (including the use
of a computer) in the process they claimed in their patent applica-
tion. In particular the respondents argued that a computer is not
necessary at all for their process, but by continuous recalculation
of cure time the risk of over- or under-curing was significantly
reduced.
The Court, in the majority opinion, determined that when
considering whether a claim is patentable subject matter under §
101, the examiner must look at the claimed invention as a whole
and not in its constituent parts. Here, according to the majority,
respondents claimed an improved process. The fact that the pro-
14. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), and Diamond v. Bradley, 450 U.S.
381 (1981), both were argued on October 14, 1980. The reports of the arguments
are found at 49 U.S.L.W. 3279 (October 21, 1980).
15. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
16. Id. at 595.
17. See supra note 7.
[Vol. 4:219
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cess involved a calculation by a computer, which by itself is unpat-
entable subject matter, is irrelevant to the finding whether the pro-
cess as a whole is patentable. Further, the examiner must decide
after determining that the claim is patentable subject matter,
whether the claimed invention is novel under § 10217.1 or obvious
under § 103. 172 The Court then decided that the respondents'
claims for an improved process for curing rubber were patentable
subject matter under § 101.
BACKGROUND
The problem Diehr presented to the Court becomes clearer
when viewed in the history and technical make-up of computers.1s
In 1946, inventors developed the first all-purpose computer, EN-
IAC.1" ENIAC's basic drawback was that it was externally
programmed, requiring the operator to rewire much of its circuitry
before each new problem. Shortly after the development of EN-
IAC, however, John von Neumann, a mathematician at Princeton
University, developed a means by which the instructions for the
operation of the computer could be stored in the computer's mem-
ory. Because the operator could enter the processor program (the
operating system), the source program (the application program)
and the data in the same manner, preparing the machine for a
given task was greatly simplified. This internally programmed
computer is the type generally used today.
The operating system is that portion of the computer which
internally controls both the manipulation of data and the instruc-
tions which the programmer supplies to it by means of his source
program. Without the back-up operating system, the computer is
simply a set of electronic equipment, incapable of performing any
task. Once internally programmed, however, the computer is capa-
ble of receiving and processing the source program, the special in-
structions which the programmer gives the computer to tell it how
17.1 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976). For the text of § 102 see supra note 1.
17.2 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976). For the text of § 103 see supra note 1.
18. The general background of the problem has been reviewed well else-
where. See, e.g., Gemignani, Legal Protection for Computer Software: The View
From '79, 7 RuT. J. CoMpUTERS, TECH. & L. 269 (1980); Novick & Wallenstein,
The Algorithm and Computer Software Patentability: A Scientific View of a Le-
gal Problem, 7 RuT. J. COMPUTERS, TECH. & L. 313 (1980). See also, Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 194 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
19. ENIAC is an acronym for Electronic Numerical Integrator and
Calculator.
19811
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to perform a particular job."0
Consequently, a basic philosophical problem has confronted
the courts. The computer itself ("hardware")2 1 requires the operat-
ing system program ("software" or "firmware") 22 before it becomes
useful for any practical purpose. The question which arises is
whether the "computer" is the hardware portion alone, or the
hardware plus the software package which comprises the operating
system. Is it the program which solves the problem, or is it the
eventual process occurring internally in the computer? "Com-
puters," being machines, fall within patentable subject matter
under § 101,28 but does a computer under the statute include the
software operating system? If it does, then the natural conclusion
is that the source program, also software, should be patentable
subject matter under § 101. This is the question the PTO, the
CCPA and the Supreme Court have tried to answer, but without
much success.
The United States Supreme Court defines a process as a mode
of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result-an act
or series of acts which transform or reduce some subject matter
into another state or thing."4 A well-known principle in patent law
is that a law of nature is not patentable," but a new process or
machine which uses a law of nature is not per se unpatentable.",
Similarly, ideas are not patentable.'7 The CCPA incorporated
20. The "operating system" is "software," (see note 22) and consists of a con-
trol program which directs and supervises all functions of the computer. Included
within the operating system are (1) a compiler, an operational program that trans-
lates a source program (the user's application program) into machine-usable form
(i.e., object code); (2) utility and service programs which perform basic data
processing tasks, and (3) operational programs which are part of the operating
system library. The "source programs" direct the computer, supported by the
control program (operating system), to perform specific user-oriented jobs. Com-
puters in Litigation Support 248-49 (W.E. Cwicklo ed. 1979).
21. "Hardware" is the physical equipment including the computer and pe-
ripheral devices. Id. at 248.
22. "Software" is the totality of programs which make the hardware perform
its jobs. The software works within the confines of the hardware and is usually
divided into the "operating system" and the "source programs." Id. at 248-49.
23. See supra note 1.
24. Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876).
25. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1973).
26. See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1976); Funk Brothers Seed
Co. v. Kalo Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948); Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio
Corp. of America, 306 U.S. 86 (1939).
27. See, e.g., In re Yuan, 188 F.2d 377 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
[Vol. 4:219
8
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 11
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol4/iss1/11
DIAMOND V. DIEHR
these principles into the "mental steps doctrine,"'" a concept it
then used to deny patents for inventions which were merely claims
for methods of computation or mathematical formulas.
In 1965, the President established a commission to suggest re-
visions to the Patent Act." This commission recommended that
computer programs'0 should not be patentable under any circum-
stance. The PTO then established guidelines making programs un-
patentable, but indicating that a programmed computer could be
part of a patentable process when the inventor combined it with
non-obvious elements to produce a new physical result. 1 Legisla-
tion to this effect failed in Congress."
Soon the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals rejected the
PTO guidelines, as well as the "mental steps doctrine," in In re
Prater,"3 where the CCPA decided that a process which may be
performed mentally is not unpatentable if the process claims also
show that one may perform the process without mental operations.
The CCPA in In re Bernhart" reaffirmed Prater and indicated
further that a computer programmed with a novel program is
physically different from the unprogrammed computer and is,
therefore, patentable as a new machine or new improvement." The
only aspect of the mental steps doctrine remaining was a prohibi-
28. The mental steps doctrine had three main elements: (1) Processes con-
sisting only of mental steps are unpatentable; (2) a process involving both mental
and physical steps is unpatentable if the only novelty lies in the mental steps; and
(3) a process which involves mental and physical steps is patentable if the novelty
or advancement of the art lies in the physical steps. In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165,
166 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
29. Exec. Order No. 11,215, 30 Fed. Reg. 4661 (1965).
30. The Commission defined "program" as a series of instructions which con-
trol or condition the operation of a data processing machine. See Gemignani,
supra note 18, at 295.
31. 33 Fed. Reg. 15,609 (1968).
32. S. 1042 and H.R. 5924, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
33. 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969). In Prater a computer was used to process
spectrographic data using well-known equations. The PTO rejected the claims
under the mental steps doctrine because the claimed method disclosed an unpat-
entable mathematical principle. The rest of the claims for the machine fell within
the prior art and were considered unpatentable.
34. 417 F.2d 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1969). Bernhart's invention was a method for
illustrating a three-dimensional object in two dimensions using a computer and
plotter which already existed. The only novelty involved was a set of mathemati-
cal equations which the computer solved. The C.C.P.A. noted that in the absence
of human involvement, there was no mental process involved.
35. Id. at 1400.
19811
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tion on patentability when the patent would amount to a total pre-
emption of the use of a scientific principle or mathematical equa-
tion. 6 This was known, then, as the "preemption doctrine."
In 1970, the CCPA rejected the PTO's use of the "point of
novelty" approach, which required the examiner to determine
whether the claimed novelty or advancement of the art rested in
an unpatentable step, such as a mental operation. If so, the entire
claim was rejected under § 101 because the claim was drawn to
non-statutory subject matter.3 7 The CCPA also adopted the "tech-
nological arts" standard, defining it in In re Benson:38 computers,
regardless of their usage, are within the technological arts and are
patentable subject matter under § 101. This set the scene for the
Supreme Court to enter the picture in Gottschalk v. Benson.3 ' In
Benson, the Supreme Court held that the claimed invention was
merely an algorithm and, as such, was unpatentable. The Court
determined that Benson's claim was so broad that if a patent were
granted, Benson would preempt the use of the algorithm by others,
and any patent issued would be a patent on the equation itself.
The Court did not rule on the "mental steps doctrine," ,but explic-
itly stated that its decision did not find programs to be unpatent-
able subject matter. Instead, the Court stated, as it has consist-
ently since, that any change in the statutory requirements under §
101 must be by act of Congress.4
In 1976, the Supreme Court again issued a decision on pro-
gram patentability in Dann v. Johnston.41 In that case the inven-
tor developed a record-keeping machine which included a
programmed digital computer. The CCPA, after reversing the
Board of Appeals' rejection of Johnston's patent, found the system
to be patentable subject matter under § 101 because the claims
were drawn for a machine. In a vigorous dissent, Judge Rich im-
plied that the court, after Benson, should no longer indulge in the
36. Id. at 1399.
37. See In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 889 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
38. 441 F.2d 682, 688 (C.C.P.A. 1971), rev'd sub nom. Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63 (1972).
39. 409 U.S. 63 (1972). Benson claimed a method for programming a com-
puter to convert a decimal number into its binary notation. Because binary nota-
tion is the form a computer uses, the program was of great interest to those work-
ing with computers. 409 U.S. at 72.
40. Id. at 71-73.
41. In re Johnston, 502 F.2d 765 (C.C.P.A. 1974), rev'd sum nom. Dann v.
Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976).
[Vol. 4:219228
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fiction that a new program changes an old computer into a new
machine.' According to Judge Rich, to decide, as the majority did,
a question of patentability on the manner in which a claim was
written exalted form over substance." The Supreme Court re-
versed the CCPA and decided that Johnston's patent application
must be rejected because the claimed invention was obvious.4'
After Johnston, the CCPA consistently interpreted Benson to
mean that computer-related processes were patentable so long as
the claimed invention did not preempt the use of the algorithm
itself. The CCPA then developed a two-prong test for finding a
program claim unpatentable. First, the examiner must determine
whether the claim recites an algorithm, and, second, if an al-
gorithm is found, the claim must be analyzed to see whether it
preempts the use of the algorithm." Only when the claim met both
prongs of this test would the CCPA apply Benson and deny the
patent.
In this way, the stage was set for real confusion. The CCPA
next stated that even if the only novelty in an invention was an
algorithm, the invention could still be statutory subject matter."
In Parker v. Flook,'7 the Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, vehe-
mently disapproved of the reasoning of the CCPA. Flook's claimed
invention was a method for updating alarm limits, a factor impor-
tant in detecting abnormal or dangerous states in catalytic conver-
sion of hydrocarbons. Flook's invention involved (1) measurement
of the present value of those variables used to compute alarm lim-
its; (2) the calculation of the new updated alarm limit using an
algorithm; and (3) replacement of the old alarm limit by the new
value. The Supreme Court rejected Flook's claims, indicating that
the presence of post-solution activity does not in itself make the
42. Id. at 773. This decision was an attempt to narrow the holding in Benson,
409 U.S. 631 because there the claims were drafted in process form, but in John-
ston, 425 U.S. 219, they were drafted in apparatus form.
43. Id. at 774.
44. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976).
45. See, e.g., In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978) and In re Toma,
575 F.2d 872 (C.C.P.A. 1978). In Freeman, the C.C.P.A. indicated that "post-solu-
tion" activity is not a determining factor. "Post-solution" activity is the ultimate
purpose for which solution of the mathematical formula is used. This played an
important role in the decision of Parker v. Flook and Diamond v. Diehr, discussed
infra.
46. 575 F.2d at 876.
47. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
1981] 229
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method or process eligible for patent protection. " Again the Su-
preme Court indicated that a process is not unpatentable simply
because it contains a law of nature or algorithm, but added that a
patentable process must be new and useful." Whether the al-
gorithm is new is irrelevant.50 Although the Court was construing §
101 of the Patent Act, which relates to the subject matter of pat-
ents, and not § 102 or § 103, which relate to novelty and obvi-
ousness of the invention,"1 the Court required a determination of
whether the novelty of a claimed process lay only in an improved
method for calculation or a mathematical formula. If this were the
case, the claimed invention did not describe patentable subject
matter under § 101." For the claim to be patentable, some other
concept in the application must be novel. 13 The Supreme Court
also determined that Benson was not to be limited to claims which
preempted the use of an algorithm, as the CCPA had believed."
The stage was now set for the Supreme Court, in Diamond v.
Diehr, to clarify the issue of the patentability of processes which
use programmed computers.
ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's majority opinion, written by Justice
Rehnquist, begins by stating that Diehr requires a construction of
§ 101, as have previous cases. In construing the section, the Court
summarized its history and found that the respondents claim a
"physical and chemical process for molding . . . synthetic rubber
products"" which is statutory subject matter under § 101. Relying
on the definition of process in Cochrane v. Deener," the Court
found respondents' claims to involve changing uncured rubber into
a different thing, a precision molded product, and therefore to be
within the traditional protection of patent laws. 5
48. Id. at 590.
49. See supra note 26.
50. 437 U.S. at 592.
51. Id. at 588. See supra note 1 for the text of § 102 and § 103.
52. Id. at 595, n. 18.
53. Id. at 594. The Court required that the examiner consider an algorithm
to be a part of prior art and then determine whether some other novel aspect of
the claim exists.
54. Id. at 589-90.
55. 450 U.S. at 184.
56. 94 U.S. 780 (1876).
57. 450 U.S. at 184.
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The majority expressly stated that its decision was not af-
fected in any way by the simple fact that the claims are dependent
on the use of a mathematical equation and a programmed com-
puter for several steps of the process. In a meager attempt to dis-
tinguish Flook,58 in which the Court had found a computer process
for updating alarm limits to be unpatentable subject matter under
§ 101, the majority stated that Flook failed to explain how one de-
termined the variables used in this calculation procedure, and that
he did not disclose any chemical processes at work. The Court de-
cided that the claims in Flook, therefore, only provided a formula
to update alarm limits."9
As the dissenting opinion, written by Justice Stevens, correctly
indicates, however, the patent application in Diehr mentions noth-
ing about the equipment used in the process except the usage of a
rheometer to measure temperature constantly, and nothing about
any process variables used in the calculation. In fact, the dissent
states that the respondents' claims offer nothing new about the
process of curing rubber.60 The dissent then argues that (1) the
patent application does not disclose anything unusual about the
device which constantly measures the temperature (a rheometer);
(2) devices for constantly measuring temperatures are well-known
(a thermometer, for example); and, most importantly, (3) the only
difference between ordinary means of operating a molding press
and respondents' claims is calculation of the solution of a mathe-
matical formula using a digital computer. In the opinion of the dis-
senters, therefore, the process is not newly discovered; the respon-
dents claim a method for updating cure time by iterative
calculation much the same way that Flook's method claimed. Just
as the petitioners argued, distinguishing Diehr from Flook is a dif-
ficult task because both involve (1) an initial calculation; (2) con-
tinual remeasurement and recalculation; and (3) a use for the value
obtained from the calculation.' This analysis, as discussed later,
misses the point, however.
The dissent indicates that the majority misapplied Flook by
confusing subject matter requirements of § 101 and novelty re-
58. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
59. 450 U.S. at 186.
60. Id. at 205-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See respondent's claims, note 7,
supra. Curing rubber is a well-known process originally patented by Charles
Goodyear over a century ago. See note 25 of the dissenting opinion in Diehr.
61. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 7, Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175
(1981).
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quirements of § 102. The dissenting Justices indicate that if the
examiner fails to find patentable subject matter under § 101, he
should never reach the question of novelty under § 102." The ma-
jority opinion, in fact, does not discuss novelty requirements, but,
citing Benson and Flook, finds that a claim which is otherwise
drawn to statutory subject matter does not become nonstatutory
simply because it involves the use of a formula or computer pro-
gram. 3 The Court says that the examiner must consider a claim as
a whole, not in its individual elements. "A new combination of
steps in a process may be patentable even though all the constitu-
ents of the combination were well-known and in common use
before the combination was made."" The novelty of the individual
steps is irrelevant in determining whether a claim is patentable
subject matter under § 101. 5 The majority does not decide, there-
fore, the patentability of respondents' claims, but only states that
they represent patentable subject matter under § 101. The claims
still may be found on remand to be unpatentable under § 102,
which requires the invention to be novel, or § 103, which requires
the invention to be non-obvious. 6"
The dissenting Justices apparently disagree with the idea of
considering the claims as a whole, because they, in an attempt to
answer the question of computer program patentability, state that
if no inventive concept is disclosed elsewhere in the patent applica-
tion, the computation steps are unpatentable under § 101."7 These
Justices, therefore, would require an examination of the individual
elements of a claim, clearly an erroneous holding in view of deci-
sions such as Flook and Benson."
The majority, under the facts presented to it, also rejected the
"preemption" doctrine as the CCPA had used it in the past." Ac-
cording to the majority, an attempt to limit the use of a formula to
62. 450 U.S. at 211-12 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 187.
64. Id. at 188.
65. Id. at 188-89.
66. Id. at 191. Confusion exists concerning whether the PTO has determined
the issues of novelty and unobviousness. See Diamond v. Diehr, Brief for Respon-
dents at 11-14, and compare the Reply Brief for Petitioner, at 3-4 and n.4. De-
pending on interpretation, the Supreme Court in reaching its decision either de-
cided, in effect, that the patent will issue or that the matter of novelty and
unobviousness still must be determined on remand to the PTO.
67. 450 U.S. at 193 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 189, n.12.
69. Id. at 191-93 and note 14 therein.
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a particular technological field will not transform unpatentable
subject matter into patentable subject matter. A claim using a
formula in a process which is otherwise patentable when consid-
ered as a whole will satisfy the requirements of § 101. The dissent-
ing Justices agree with the rejection of the preemption theory, but
they point out, contrary to statements in the majority opinion, that
the post-solution activity in Flook was no lqss significant than the
use of post-solution activity to open the molds in Diehr. In both
cases this activity is a crucial part of the industrial process, but the
activity cannot be used to determine patentability. To do so, ac-
cording to the majority, would exalt form over substance, allowing
any draftsman to claim some form of post-solution activity for any
mathematical formula and produce patentable subject matter."0
The majority, however, appears to have done this very thing.
As the dissenting Justices argue, the manner in which the majority
distinguishes Flook is difficult to accept. Although the claims in
Flook may not have explicitly stated the means by which one was
to measure continually process variables used in the calculation
there, one may assume that such measurement must occur at the
designated time intervals or the claimed invention is useless, and
Flook would not have applied for a patent. In Diehr, the major
distinguishing factor from Flook is the use of a rheometer 71 to con-
stantly measure temperature within the molds. Such a finding
seems insufficient reason to discard the earlier Court decision in
Flook and reach the opposite result in Diehr.
The dissenting and majority opinions can be reconciled if one
looks to the subject each addresses. Generally, the focus of the ma-
jority opinion is the construction of § 101. The dissenting opinion
attempts to address two issues: (1) the patentability of computer
programs, the question which the majority avoids so well, and (2)
the novelty of the claims. The majority opinion's failure to con-
sider this first question is obvious from the outset, because the
Court addresses patentability of the process as a whole, not in its
constituent parts.73 In doing so, the majority has approved the
CCPA practice of allowing processes which involve the use of a
70. Id. at 192. But see 450 U.S. at 212, n.36 (dissenting opinion).
71. See the claims as set forth in Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 594, 597 (1978).
72. 450 U.S. at 177-78, n.2.
73. Id. The Court states it is determining whether a "process for curing syn-
thetic rubber which includes in several of its steps the use of a mathematical
formula and a programmed digital computer is patentable subject matter under
35 U.S.C. § 101." (Emphasis added).
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programmed computer to be patentable subject matter under §
101. Beyond this far-reaching74 decision, however, the Court also
has finally clarified the confusion that the earlier decision in Flook
created. As the CCPA has recognized for nearly a decade, applying
§ 101 (subject matter), § 102 (novelty), and § 103 (obviousness)
requires the examiner, before granting or denying a patent, to un-
derstand that each of these sections is an independent requirement
which the claimed invention must meet. Flook hopelessly confused
novelty requirements of § 102 with patentable subject matter re-
quirements under § 101. 76 Although the majority in Diehr resolved
the major conflicts which Flook and its ancestors created, the
Court could not appropriately overrule Flook at this point because
that case still presents good law, particularly the important pro-
position known earlier in patent law but confused by the Court
itself in Flook and earlier cases: any new process is not unpatent-
able simply because it incorporates a law of nature or algorithm.7
Diehr explicitly adopts this rule and requires the examiner to view
the process as a whole, not in separate elements. The basis on
which the majority distinguishes Flook is meager, yet justified
when one considers the substantial clarification of the law that the
decision in Diehr provides.
The dissenting Justices' opinion, although attempting to de-
termine the propriety of patents on computer programs, states
nothing which previous decisions have not already said. Generally,
the dissent appears to perpetuate the Court's earlier confusing
statements concerning program patentability under § 101. The dis-
senting Justices state once again, however, that such a determina-
tion is beyond the Court's constitutional authority. Because the
majority failed to consider program patentability, the Court again
allows Congress to decide the issue. Apparently, however, the ma-
jority and dissenting Justices do agree on one idea, though the dis-
sent misapplies it: Sections 102 and 101 are indeed separate ele-
74. The Patent Office indicates that over 3,000 pending applications may be
affected by the decision in Diehr. Wall Street Journal, March 4, 1981, at 4.
75. The Diehr dissenting opinion continues to misapply the novelty require-
ment even though the Justices clearly indicate that § 101 and § 102 should be
considered separately. See note 61, supra, and compare the language the dissent
uses. The substitution of "algorithm" for method in determining whether any in-
ventive concept is disclosed appears to be a "cloak" for an analysis of novelty, yet
the Court claims to be determining patentable subject matter under § 101. 450
U.S. at 193 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76. See supra note 26.
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ments which a claimed invention must satisfy before the Patent
Office can issue a patent. Until now the Supreme Court did not
apply that analysis in determining the patentability of a process
involving the use of a computer.
Although Diehr answers the important question of patentabil-
ity of processes involving computers and continues the Supreme
Court's trend77 of expanding the view of the patentability of vari-
ous subjects, the question of patentability of computer programs is
still unanswered. When one considers that computer hardware is
readily patentable, the failure of the Court to recognize patentabil-
ity of software, which is necessary to operate the hardware, is diffi-
cult indeed to rationalize.
The important policy underlying patents, the promotion of
technology and science, and the rapidly growing technology of the
present times require one to look closely at the arguments7' for
and against the patentability of computer programs.
Many argue that the complexity involved in applying for pat-
ents of computer programs would decrease the demand for patent
protection for a number of reasons: First, drafting of claims would
be exceedingly expensive and difficult because the patent attorney
would need to describe meticulously each step of the program. Sec-
ond, the delay in processing the claim may result in diminishing
the value of the program, because of rapid technological advances
in the field which could make the program outdated. Third, once a
patent is obtained, the Patent Office makes the program available
so that anyone may obtain copies. Detection of infringement would
be impossible because the user simply could run the program on
his own computer, store the machine language version of the pro-
gram on disk or tape, and then destroy the original copy of the
program. No one could interpret the machine language version and
claim that it infringes the original program. Alternatively, the pro-
gram could be translated into another programming language, in
which case an expert could determine similarity but not identity of
the two programs. The question of novelty or obviousness would be
difficult to resolve in such a situation. Fourth, and perhaps most
important, is the argument that the PTO is incapable of processing
applications for computer program patents for two reasons:7' (a)
lack of classification technique and (b) lack of necessary search
77. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
78. These questions are reviewed extensively in Gemignani, supra note 18.
79. 450 U.S. at 218, n.45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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files. The volume of material which the PTO would have to catalog
would prevent adequate searches, the result being that patenting
programs would amount only to a registration of them.
Countering these very strong arguments against patentability,
the industry and the American Patent Law Associaton argue that
since protection for hardware exists, then software, an essential for
the operation of hardware, should be patentable also.80 This pre-
supposes, however, that the program meets other criteria for pat-
entability. The industry further argues that the protection patents
afford and the resulting usual open transfer of ideas is necessary to
promote and advance the technology of the field. The present se-
crecy involved in the industry stifles rapid advancement, they
claim, although this is difficult to believe when one considers the
phenomenal growth of the software field.8 In fact, one may ques-
tion whether software developers would seek patents at all, consid-
ering the ease of infringement without detection mentioned earlier.
Unfortunately, only time and experience will answer these and
other questions.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Diamond v. Diehr affirms
the prior holdings of the CCPA and brings into conformity with
other areas of patent law the rules applied in the case of processes
involving the use of computers. First, processes involving the use of
a computer are not per se unpatentable under § 101. Further, an
examiner, when determining the issue of patentability, must look
at §§ 101, 102 and 103 as separate and independent statutory re-
quirements which must be fulfilled before an invention can be con-
sidered patentable. Finally, the examiner must view a claim as a
whole and not in its elemental parts.
The majority decision subtly bypasses the issue of whether or
not a computer program, in itself, is a patentable invention. Pre-
sumably, this is an indication that the Court is planning, once
again, to allow Congress to decide the issue. Even so, the results of
Diehr have far-reaching economic implications. Under Diehr, any
process which involves the use of a computer is patentable subject
matter as long as the other requirements for patentability are sat-
80. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (amicus curiae brief for the
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations and separate amicus curiae
brief for American Patent Law Association).
81. See supra note 3; See also, Gemignani supra note 18, at 274.
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isfied. If manufacturers can incorporate computers in the develop-
ment of manufacturing processes, producing patentable inventions,
the economic and technological benefits are obvious. This raises
other interesting questions such as what degree of specificity of
claims will be required to prevent infringement by later inventors?
When will differences in invention be sufficient to meet the novelty
and obviousness requirements of § 102 and § 103? Will a minor
change in the computer program itself prevent infringement? How,
if at all, will infringement be detected? These and many other
questions existed before Diehr and today are still unanswered.
Only future judicial interpretation and time will clarify these
problems.
The issue, however, remains that which the Court so carefully
avoided. Is computer software, absent any other patentable inven-
tion, patentable in itself? One might believe that the Supreme
Court is yielding to the views and expertise of the CCPA in decid-
ing technically complicated issues of patentability and, presuming
failure of Congress to act, ultimately will exercise "judicial legisla-
tive powers", contrary to statements in past decisions, to find that
software is patentable subject matter. As the Court indicates, these
arguments for and against patentabilty are important and perhaps
are more appropriately addressed by Congress than by the Su-
preme Court. One must wonder, however, how the Court in
Chakrabarty82 was willing to expand § 101 to incorporate patents
on naturally occurring phenomena which are modified into a new
and useful living organism, yet, at present, will not allow a patent
on a mathematical formula or algorithm, which when modified into
a computer program, yields a new and useful product. The step
from Chakrabarty to patentability of computer programs is small
indeed. If the Supreme Court is consistent in allowing an expan-
sive view of patentable subject matter under § 101, as it did in
Chakrabarty, and continues to follow the progressive CCPA lead,
the Court will take that small step soon and determine that com-
puter software is patentable subject matter.
Ron Karl Levy
82. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
1981]
19
Levy: Patent Law - The Next-to-Last Step to Software Patentability?
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1981
